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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOTY LYN BROWN, : 
Petitioner/Appellant, Case No. 960396 
v. : 
Priority No. 3 
STATE OF UTAH, 
HANK GALETKA, 
Respondents/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of a petition for 
extraordinary relief filed pursuant to rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (currently 
rule 65C and Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq. (1996)). This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the district court properly dismiss the petition as frivolous? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
In reviewing an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for extraordinary relief, 
this Court reviews for correctness the district court's "conclusions of law that underlie the 
dismissal of the petition." Pascual v. Carver. 876 P.2d 364, 366 (Utah 1994). Accord 
Fernandez v. Cook. 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989). Seg also Gerrish v. Barnes. 844 P.2d 
315, 318-19 (Utah 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The text of any relevant constitutional provisions, statutes or rules is 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After a jury trial in the Third Judicial District Court, Tooele County, petitioner 
was convicted of second degree murder, a first degree felony, and sentenced to serve five 
years-to-life at the Utah State Prison (R. 127). This Court transferred petitioner's direct 
appeal to the court of appeals, which affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence on the 
basis that petitioner's appeal was wholly frivolous (R. 64). Petitioner filed a petition for 
extraordinary relief challenging his conviction (R. 1-49). The district court dismissed the 
petition as frivolous, and petitioner timely appealed (R. 161,114). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
By information dated August 30,1989, petitioner was charged with one count 
of murder in the second degree, a first degree felony (R. 135-136). Petitioner was initially 
represented by public defender Alan K. Jeppesen (R. 133). On September 18,1989, Paul 
Gotay entered his appearance as counsel for petitioner (R. 131). Mr. Jeppesen 
subsequently withdrew as petitioner's counsel (R. 129). After a jury trial in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Tooele County, petitioner was convicted as charged (R. 127). 
Petitioner filed a motion to arrest judgment, which the trial court denied on March 12,1990. 
(R. 118,120-125). Thereafter, the trial court sentenced petitioner to serve five years-to-life 
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at the Utah State Prison, in addition to the appropriate fine and restitution (R. 127). On 
March 12,1990, Mr. Gotay withdrew as petitioner's counsel (R. 116). 
Petitioner filed his notice of appeal in this Court on March 21,1990 (R. 114). 
On May 21, 1990, Alan K. Jeppesen entered his appearance as petitioner's appellate 
counsel, pursuant to an appointment by the trial court (R. 109-110). Subsequently, this 
court transferred petitioner's appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition (R. 107). 
Mr. Jeppesen filed an Anders brief raising all issues which he thought could be raised on 
petitioner's behalf, even though it was Mr. Jeppesen's conclusion that the appeal was 
frivolous (R. 82-105). On May 6,1991, petitioner filed several pro se motions, requesting 
new appellate counsel and requesting an extension of time in which to file a supplemental 
appellate brief (R. 70-80). The court of appeals denied petitioner's request for new 
counsel, but granted petitioner a thirty-day extension in which to file his supplemental brief 
(R. 68). As of July 10, 1991, petitioner had not yet filed his supplemental brief. The court 
of appeals notified petitioner that he had until July 18, 1991 in which to file his 
supplemental brief (R. 66). On August 23, 1991, the court of appeals issued a 
memorandum decision affirming petitioner's convbticn on the basis that the appeal was 
wholly frivolous (R. 64). Despite numerous opportunities, petitioner failed to file a 
supplemental brief fid.). 
On or about October 31, 1995,1 petitioner filed a petition for extraordinary 
relief pursuant to rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 1-49). Petitioner claimed 
Petitioner signed the petition on October 6,1995, however, it was not filed in the 
district court until October 31, 1995 (R. 49). 
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that: (a) the trial court violated petitioner's due process rights by appointing Alan Jeppesen 
as appellate counsel where the trial court knew that a conflict of interest existed between 
petitioner and Mr. Jeppesen; (b) Mr. Jeppesen was ineffective and denied petitioner his 
right to a direct appeal by filing an Anders brief; and (c) the court of appeals failed to 
conduct a comprehensive review of the record in reaching its determination that petitioner's 
appeal was wholly frivolous (R. 39-49). The district court requested a response to the 
petition and, therefore, respondents filed a dispositive motion (R. 138-143; Addendum A). 
Petitioner, through counsel Kevin Robson, filed a memorandum in opposition to 
respondents' motion to dismiss, claiming that: (1) Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) violates 
the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution; and (2) Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 
violates federal due process (R. 148-158; Addendum B). On August 29,1996, the district 
court issued an order dismissing the petition as frivolous on its face (R. 161; Addendum 
C). Petitioner now appeals the district court's ruling. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Although the petition may not have been frivolous on its face, this Court may 
affirm a district court's decision on any proper ground, even though the district court 
assigned another reason for its ruling. £eg generally Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.. 
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986). Since 
petitioner's claims are time-barred by the four-year catch-all statute of limitations contained 
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (1992), this Court should affirm the district court's ruling. 
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ARGUMENT 
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE TIME-BARRED AND, 
THEREFORE, THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE 
DISTRICT COURTS DISMISSAL 
Since the district court requested a response to the petition, the court 
implicitly determined that the petition was not frivolous on its face. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B(b)(7)-(8). Therefore, the district court's subsequent ruling dismissing the petition as 
frivolous on its face is inconsistent with its initial ruling requiring a response. Nevertheless, 
this Court may affirm a district court's decisions on any proper ground, even though the 
district court assigned another reason for its ruling. See Buehner Block Co. v. UWC 
Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988) (appellate court may affirm for reason other than 
that given by trial court). Accord State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986). 
As support for his claim that the district court incorrectly dismissed the petition 
as frivolous, petitioner argues on appeal that: (1) he did not fully and fairly adjudicate his 
claims on direct appeal because his appeal was inadequate, (2) allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel may be raised for the first time on appeal; and (3) Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-35a-107 (1996) is unconstitutional because state post-conviction relief is a federally-
created cause of action. Brief of Appellant at 9. 
Since the district court did not find that the petition was procedurally barred, 
the issue of whether petitioner adjudicated his current issues on direct appeal is irrelevant. 
Furthermore, although a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may, under certain 
circumstances, be raised for the first time in a post-conviction proceeding, it must still be 
raised in a timely manner, absent good cause or unusual circumstances. Finally, the 
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constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 is irrelevant because it was neither 
argued to nor relied upon by the district court as a basis for dismissal (R. 138-143, 161; 
Addenda A & C). Nevertheless, petitioner incorrectly alleges that state post-conviction 
relief is a federally created or mandated remedy.2 Brief of Appellant at 9. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 provides that the time limitation for bringing an 
action for relief not otherwise provided for by law is four years. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
25(3) (1992). The applicable statute of limitations governing petitions for post-conviction 
relief was declared unconstitutional on September 17,1993. See Currier v. Holden. 862 
P.2d 1357, 1372 (Utah App. 1993) (90-day statute of limitations contained in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-31.1 violates the open courts provision of the Utah constitution). In the 1995 
session, the legislature passed a new statute of limitations for rule 65B(b) petitions, 
however, such statute did not take effect until May 1,1995. In order to afford inmates an 
opportunity to learn of the new statute's existence, respondent elected not to invoke the 
one-year statute of limitations until May 1,1996. Therefore, the four-year catch-all statute 
of limitations properly applies to petitioner's claim.3 See generally Dansie v. Anderson 
Lumber Co.. 878 P.2d 1155, 1157-59 (Utah App. 1994) (trial court properly applied § 78-
2See Pennsylvania v. Finley. 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (states have no obligation 
to provide post-conviction relief). 
3Even if this Court applies the one-year statute of limitations, petitioner's claims 
are barred. The court of appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction on August 23, 1991. 
Accordingly, petitioner was required to raise his claims by September 23,1992 (one-
year after the expiration of the 30-day time-period in which to file a petition for writ of 
certiorari). £g£ Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1(2)(c) (1995) (currently renumbered as § 
78-35a-107)(1996)). 
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12-25 in product liability action where the Utah Supreme Court, prior to the filing of the 
complaint, declared the specific six-year statute of limitations unconstitutional). 
Petitioner's allegations all involve his conviction which became final on 
August 23, 1991, when the court of appeals issued its memorandum decision. 
Accordingly, petitioner had until August 23,1995 in which to raise his claims, however, he 
did not file his petition until October 31,1995 (R. 49). Petitioner certainly knew of the facts 
underlying his issues by the conclusion of his direct appeal4, and has failed to demonstrate 
good cause,5 to either the district court or this Court, for his failure to timely raise them. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, respondent respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the district court's dismissal of the petition for extraordinary relief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Q?TTay of January, 1997 
( I f ^ thdCA^ 
ANGELA F. MICKLOS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
4ln his motion seeking appointment of new appellate counsel, petitioner 
repeatedly referred to the alleged conflict of interest between Mr. Jeppesen and himself 
(R. 74-80; Addendum D). 
5Although § 78-12-25(3) does not have a specific good cause provision, 
respondents and the district court afforded petitioner an opportunity to show good 
cause. In their dispositive memorandum, respondents argued that petitioner had failed 
to demonstrate good cause for his untimely petition (R. 139; Addendum A). Thereafter, 
petitioner, through counsel, replied to respondents' dispositive motion (R. 148-158; 
Addendum B). However, petitioner failed to allege or demonstrate good cause (jdj. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellees 
were mailed, postage prepaid, this of January, 1997 to: 
Doty Lyn Brown 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
(jL-jyfL. 1. 4JL,-CZ£^ 
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A D D E N D U M A 
J ' . 
ANGELA F. MICKLOS (6229) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
P.O. Box 140854 
160 E. 300 S., 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOTY L. BROWN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION 
FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
Case No. 950300067 
Judge L.A. Dever 
Respondent, through Angela F. Micklos, Assistant Attorney General, 
respectfully submits the following memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss the 
petition for extraordinary relief. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. By information dated August 30,1989, petitioner was charged with one 
count of murder in the second degree, a first degree felony. See Information, attached as 
Exhibit 1. 
000143 
2. Petitioner was initially represented by public defender Alan K. 
Jeppesen. See Exhibit 2. 
3. On September 18, 1989, Paul Gotay entered his appearance as 
counsel for petitioner. See Entry of Appearance, attached as Exhibit 3. Mr. Jeppesen 
formally withdrew as petitioner's counsel on September 20, 1989. See Notice of 
Withdrawal of Counsel, attached as Exhibit 4. 
4. After a jury trial in the Third Judicial District Court, Tooele County, 
petitioner was convicted as charged. See Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) to Utah 
State Prison, attached as Exhibit 5. See also Trial Transcripts, case no. 891300077. 
5. Petitioner filed a motion to arrest judgment, which the trial court denied 
on March 12,1990. £ee_ Exhibits 6 & 7. 
6. On March 12,1990, the trial court sentenced petitioner to serve five 
years-to-life at the Utah State Prison, in addition to the appropriate fine and restitution. 
See Exhibit 5. 
7. On March 12,1990,. Mr. Gotay withdrew as petitioner's counsel. See 
Notice of Withdrawal, attached as Exhibit 8. 
8. On March 21,1990, petitioner's notice of appeal was filed in the Utah 
Supreme Court. S_§e_ Exhibit 9. 
2 
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9. On May 21, 1990, Alan K. Jeppesen entered his appearance as 
petitioner's appellate counsel, pursuant to an appointment by the trial court. See 
Appearance of Counsel, attached as Exhibit 10; Order Appointing Public Defender 
Attorney, attached as Exhibit 11. 
10. On June 5,1990, petitioner's s, ' •- as transferred to the Utah Court 
of Appeals for disposition. See Exhibit 12. 
11. On September 25,1990, Mr. Jeppesen filed an Anders brief raising 
all issues which he thought could be raised on petitioner's behalf, even though it was Mr. 
Jeppesen's conclusion that the appeal was frivolous. See Appellant's Brief, attached as 
Exhibit 13. 
12. On May 6, 1991, petitioner filed several pro se motions, requesting 
new appellate counsel and requesting an extension of time in which to file a supplemental 
appellate brief. See Exhibits 14 & 15 
13. On May 23,1991, the court of appeals denied petitioner's request for 
new counsel, but granted petitioner a thirty-day extension in which to file his supplemental 
brief. See Order, attached as Exhibit 16. 
14. As of July 10,1991, petitioner had not yet filed his supplemental brief. 
The court of appeals notified petitioner that he had until July 16,1991 in which to file his 
supplemental brief. See Exhibit 17. 
3 
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15. On August 23, 1991, the court of appeals issued a memorandum 
decision affirming petitioner's conviction on the basis that the appeal was wholly frivolous. 
See Memorandum Decision, attached as Exhibit 18. Despite numerous opportunities, 
petitioner failed to file a supplemental brief. JgL. 
16. On or about October 31, 1995, petitioner filed a petition for 
extraordinary relief pursuant to rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner 
claims that: (a) the trial court violated petitioner's due process rights by appointing Alan 
Jeppesen as appellate counsel where the trial court knew that a conflict of interest existed 
between petitioner and Mr. Jeppesen; (b) Mr. Jeppesen was ineffective and denied 
petitioner his right to a direct appeal by filing an Anders brief; and (c) the court of appeals 
failed to conduct a comprehensive review of the record in reaching its determination that 
petitioner's appeal was wholly frivolous. See petition. 
ARGUMENT 
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE TIME-BARRED BY THE 
FOUR-YEAR CATCH-ALL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
CONTAINED IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(3) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 provides that the time limitation for bringing an 
action for relief not otherwise provided for by law is four years. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
25(3) (1992). The statute of limitations governing petitions for post-conviction relief was 
declared unconstitutional on September 17,1993. See Currier v. Holden. 862 P.2d 1357, 
4 
OOOi 
1372 (Utah App. 1993) (90-day statute of limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
31.1 violates the open courts provision of the Utah constitution). In the 1995 session, the 
legislature passed a new statute of limitations for rule 65B(b) petitions, however, such 
statute did not take effect until May 1,1995. In order to afford inmates an opportunity to 
learn of the new statute's existence, respondent has elected not to invoke the one-year 
statute of limitations until May 1, 1996. Therefore, the four-year catch-all statute of 
limitations properly applies to petitioner's claim. See generally Dansie v. Anderson Lumber 
Co.. 878 P.2d 1155,1157-59 (Utah App. 1994j (trial court properly applied § 78-12-25 in 
product liability action where the Utah Supreme Court, prior to the filing of the complaint, 
declared the specific six-year statute of limitations unconstitutional). 
Petitioner's claims all involve his conviction which became final on August 23, 
1991, when the court of appeals issued its memorandum decision. Accordingly, petitioner 
had until August 23,1995 in which to raise his claims. Petitioner certainly knew of the facts 
underlying his claims by the conclusion of his direct appeal1, and has not demonstrated 
good cause for his failure to timely raise them. Accordingly, this Court should dismiss the 
petition as time-barred. 
1ln his motion seeking appointment of new appellate counsel, petitioner 
repeatedly referred to the alleged conflict of interest between Mr. Jeppesen and 
himself. See Exhibit 14. 
5 000139 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, respondent respectfully requests that this Court 
dismiss the petition as time-barred. 
DATED this &~ day of April, 1996. 
q ^UcMoo 
ANGELA F. MICKLOS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
was mailed, postage prepaid, this ^> day of April, 1996 to: 
Kevin K. Robson 
BERTCH & BIRCH 
Attorneys for petitioner 
5296 S. Commerce Dr., #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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f<LED SL. 
KEVIN h, ROBSON, „ " ) 
BERTCH & BIRCH 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
5296 South Commerce Drive, #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: 262-5300 
Facsimile: 7 62-2111 
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THE "CATCH ALL" FOUR YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, AS THE STATE 
HAS APPLIED IT TO THE INSTANT ACTION. VIOLATES THE OPEN COURT 
GUARANTEES AS PROVIDED BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. ARTICLE lr 
SECTION 11, 
At common law, a petition for Habeas Corpus had no time limit. 
Over time, states created their own provisions for the filing of 
Habeas petitions, and incorporated them into their respective 
constitutions. Utah has created its own right to petition for 
Habeas corpus, as found in Article I, Section V. These petitions 
were created in order to allow prisoners to be able to file their 
petition in state rather than federal courts. See Hurst v. Cookr 
777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989). In fact, currently, the federal courts 
do not limit the availability of a Habeas Corpus petition until the 
state has demonstrated that they have been unfairly prejudiced by 
the delay. 
Recently, in Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d, 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), the court held that the legislature had 
unconstitutionally, and in violation of the open court guarantees 
found in the Utah constitution, created a statute of limitations 
for Habeas petitions that limited the time for filing to 90 days 
and contained no provision for excusable delay. 
Noting that the right to petition for Habeas Corpus is based 
upon Article I, Section V of the Utah Constitution, the Currier 
court correctly applied a heightened scrutiny standard to the 
statute of limitations for Habeas petitions. Id. The Currier 
court noted it will exercise stricter scrutiny when evaluating 
measures which encroach upon personal liberties than it would for 
those statutes which effect economic interests. Respondent cites 
Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co. 878 P.2d 1155 (Utah App. 1994) for 
000157 
\ t;> the ifisLci case Dansie does *^u app^. i . ^
 riL^w./. 
case, because ecor.oiric interests are sub^ectec to less scrutiny 
ArticJ' . . , U . . ^ / ^ O P r>-m\_ ts 
restricting •. j* i . • -beas, .-etitic v-t-b- p.; . 
* * r r« - -* "rested 
rifically • J - ^LIL, ;*e:e H*> » 
fi^-^^o rh- slature found a filing state interes* 
The state is * JJ- I^.-*. ,• - ^^~ ^w<.erjCe rf » specific 
statue doai^ r%^ r w v 4 . habeas Corpu* 
foui 
• :i E signed to a;;!-. contracts anc *•* -*: . cim* ii.voicing ecoiiu, * 
j nt-^rest " ^  *• f n r vear ^tatt^p * 
limitations longer _;, 
legislature .\3- subsequently e- •-• . r^ year statute . — . . 
doe — "rovide for excusabl* 
iL^ LLQL, S propose,^ _
 : r . 
clearly :H violatior e • r-j: * - : inu ; r. Curr-
Oml * * . . , * . » * . . ,
 H ^ * *. 
extreme ^iwu.;.ia;. -t p: , < 
state't * If :"posed s* a* : :e f eir prison 
sentenrpf miri ||iiirt b) vnr i « ly because Lhe statute of limitations had 
sidering > clings affecting 'he 
-
 v
 — uu Habeas 
000156 
proceedings, the Utah State Legislature has enacted a statute which 
provides a provision for excusable delay, within the new statute 
itself. See §78-12-31.1 UCA, 1995. 
In Currier v. Holden. 862 P.2d 1357 (Ct. App. 1993), the court 
noted that; the inflexibility of the 90 day statute limitations, 
combined with the lack of any provision within the statute for 
excusable delay rendered the statute itself unconstitutional as a 
violation of the open courts provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
If this court determines that application of the four year 
"catch all** statute is appropriate, it must then turn to a 
constitutional analysis. As has been indicated above, the four 
year statute was not specifically enacted to apply to Habeas 
petitions, does not provide any provision for excusable delay, is 
arbitrary, and makes no specific findings that the state has a 
compelling state interest justifying the statute. Therefore, 
application of the four year statute to a petition for Habeas 
Corpus, violates the open court guarantees found within the Utah 
Constitution. 
Alternatively, the court may determine that in the absence of 
any specific provision governing the filing of Habeas petitions 
during the time the petition was filed, that the time period for 
filing reverted back to a common law standard, or federal standard. 
Neither the common law nor the federal law contain a time limit. 
If this court determines that the instant Habeas petition is 
outside the statutory period for filing, the Currier court's 
interpretation of the constitutionality of the limitation of Habeas 
proceedings provides that there must be a provision for excusable 
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delay. 
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Habeas petitions pnoi to LJbe issues now nnt 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS FOUND IN 578-12-31,1 SERVES NO 
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE PERSONAL 
LIBERTY INTEREST EMBODIED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND IS THEREFORE INVALID, 
* " I proffer the 
•o c w*.) spelled out in, 
_ a 11 a c h e d a n d 
above argument, Petitiort 
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Motion to Dismiss, the petitioner respectfully requests that this 
court deny Respondent's motion. 
DATED this _£? day of May, 1996. 
Kevin K. Robson 
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M L C IM U I 
nt i HIRD DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNT 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH ' 
DOTY L. bKUWN, 
vs. 
Petitiuiu.1 
espondent 
Order 
Case # 95 030 0067 
Judge L. A. Dever 
The Goun — . .
 r— - - - - - -
Petitioner's request for extraordinary relief. The Court finds that Petitioner's claim is 
frivolous on its face. 
Dated this 29 th 
eby certify that a true an 
postage prepaid, this 43&tKda' 
Kevin K. Robson 
5296 S. Commerce Dr., #100 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84107 
BAILING 
the foregoing ORDER was mailed, 
Angela F. Micklos 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake Cityctft-84414-0854 
Deputy CourfClerk 
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A D D E N D U M D 
OOTY L. 2?.0!TN r ? | C n 
In Prouria Persona if L r^[J « 
Central Utah Correctional Facility * 
Post Office 3ox 550 HAY A ICC! 
Gunnison, Utah 34634 M A T 6 199! 
COURT OF APPEALS 
1:1 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
000O000 
DOTY L. 3?*OV7W 
p e t i t i o n e r / A p p e l l a n t 
Vs. 
Itate of Utah, 
Tasoondent 
HOTIOH FOR APPOINTMENT 
OP APPEAL COUNSEL AMD 
ATFIDAVIT 
CASE :TO. 900316-CA 
oooOooo 
CO:iES NOVJ, petitioner/appellant nOTY L. BROUN and respectfully 
moves this court to use its discretionary power to appoint .attorney 
at Lav; :!r. PAUL GOTAY to represent him on appeal in the above-entitled 
case. 
In support of tiiis motion petitioner/appellant request's that 
this court review his affidavit in support of Request to Proceed 
in Forma Pauperis• 
Petitioner/Appellant does depose and say that: 
!• In August of 1989 !lr.ALLEN JEPPSON Attorney at Law was 
appointed Defense Counsel for the Second Degree Murder Trial of State 
of Utah Vs. Doty L. Brown. 
000080 
2. In September of 123? "lr. ALLITT -7EPPS0:: defense Counsel was 
""•ired f^ r "conflict of interest" and replaced by Attorney ^t Law 
Ir. 7.VJL -3TAY 
3. Ir. G0TA1T acted in the role of defense counsel throughout 
tne Second Degree -urder Trial and only withdrew as counsel after 
sentence was imposed on Jlirch 12 1990. 
4. The money was not available to retain said counsel to insure 
and orotect the First nights of Appeal guaranteed a convicted person. 
5. honorable Judge T*no, of The Third Judicial district Court 
ro-nooointcd 7:ttorney -t a^:; *:r. Mien Jeooson to oursue the aopeal 
of the jury conviction in state of 'Ttan Vs. notv L. r^ov.Tn in %Iarcn 
of 1990. 
5. Due to the "conflict of interest" which originated when 
*!r. Allen Jeopson was replaced sis Defense Counsel in August 1939, 
and his re-appointment as the counsel of record for APPEAL in March 
of 1990, caused the lac]: of interest in the out-come of said APPEAL. 
7. Attorney at Law :!r. Allen Jeppson did in fact violate the 
mandated decision of the Utah Supreme Court in State Vs. Clayton, 
Utah 539 P. 2d. 168. Petitioner/Appellant state's for the record 
here and now that counsel on appeal violated the following reference 
numbers in the above cited case starting with !!o. one (1), two (2), 
four (4) and five(5). 
S. Due to the "conflict of interest" between counsel and 
appellant. Attorney at Lav; *!r. Allen Jeppson sent to the Court of 
Appeals a letter stating that the appeal brief and the issues 
presented were frivolous. 
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9. Petitioner/Appellant upon learning of the letter sent to 
the Court of Vopeals stating that the appeal of the conviction of 
Doty L. Brown for the crime of Second Degree ilurder was frivolous. 
Caused a substitute Attorney at Law to be immediately hired Attorney 
:Ir. Jay Fitt, upon receiving a retainer notified attorney Allen 
Jeppson that he was taking over the case and would file a new 
supplemental appeal brief. 
10. Attorney at T^ aw .lr. Allen Jeopson failed or refused to 
turn over the trial transcripts to Attorney at Lav; Mr. Jay Pitt and 
hence-fourth ?ir. Jay Pitt never follow through with submitting a 
supplemental .brief on behaif of the Appellant. 
11. Attorney at Lav; Mr. Jay Pitt was hired and paid a retainer 
fee in September 1990, and was fired in April 1991 for failure to 
pursue the supplemental brief he was hired to do. 
12. Upon learning that no supplemental brief was ever filed. 
Immediately the original trial defense counsel :ir. Paul Gotay was 
contacted to find out if there was some way that he could be persuaded 
to act in the role as counsel of record for the appeal of the 
conviction of Doty L. Brown. 
12. Attorney at Law Mr. Paul Gotay stated that he would be 
more than glad to handle the appeal i£ the Utah Court of Appeals 
would appoint him. 
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13. Petitioner/Aooellant '.?as told to file a motion in propria 
oorsona to the Utah Court of Appeals requesting the appointment of 
Attorney at Lau (his-self) :ir. Paul Gotay to act in the role as appeal 
counsel. 
UHERS FO?vEf Petitioner/appellant \)oty 1. ^rovm respectfully 
request the Justices of the Utah Court of Appeals to use their 
''liscretionary pov;er to aopoinz Attorney at Law ".r. Paul Gotay as 
the attorney of record in the appeal of tne Second Degree r.urder 
conviction of Dotv L. 3ro\;n. 
DATED: This «^Q day of April 1991. 
?*espectfully Submitted 
DOTY L. BHO!TNf In Propria Persona 
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In Propria Persona 
Central Utah Correctional Facility 
Post Office Dox 550 
Gunnison, Utah 34 534 
IN TIIS UTAH COUP.T OF APPEALS 
000O000 
DOTY L. 3P0UI! 
Petitioner/Appellant 
State of Utah, 
Respondent 
AFFIDAVIT 
CASS 110. 1)0031 S-CA 
oooOooo 
COMES !!OU, petitioner/appellant 750TY L. BROWN herein moves this 
court to use its discretionary power to appoint Attorney at Law Mr. 
PAUL COTAY to represent him on appeal in the above-entitled case. 
In support of this motion petitioner/appellant request's that 
this court review his affidavit. 
Petitioner/Appellant does depose and say that: 
1. I am j3£ years old. 
2. I am unable to afford counsel to represent me in this cause 
of action. 
3. I have no schooling or training in law. 
4. I believe that I am not able to do an adequate job of 
representing myself on appeal. 
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5. The legal isauas are complicatad and I don't 'mow hov; to 
supoorr tha nerita of mv issues on the lav; in a aooeal. 
DATED: T h i s •iT , ay of April 1991 
^esoectfullv Submitted 
DOTY L. 3?.0TPJ, In Propria Persona 
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Jay Fitt 
Attorney at Law 
835 East 1400 South 
Orem, Utah 84058 
(801) 226-1718 
October lf 1990 
Alan K. Jeppesen, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
85 North Main Street 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
Re: State v. Doty Lyn Brown 
Dear Mr. Jeppesen: 
I have been employed by Mr. Brown to pursue his appeal and other 
post conviction remedies that might be available to him. I would 
appreciate it if you would send me such materials that may be in 
your possession which may be helpful. I do need the transcript 
of the trial, copies of all documents that would constitute the 
record in the case and anything else you might consider helpful. 
I would appreciate receiving them very promptly as he desires 
that I prepare a supplemental brief. 
Thanking you in advance for your cooperation,I am, 
Sincerely yours, 
Jay Fitt 
JF/* 
cc: Doty Lyn Brown 
